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A Union by Any Other Name? How Capital Misses the Mark on the Position of Worker
Centers within the Current Labor Law Regime
*Elizabeth Dailey
I.

Introduction
Worker centers, community-based organizations that serve the most marginalized and
unrepresented workers in American society, are under attack, again. With the decline of
traditional labor unions in recent decades, worker centers have emerged to fill the void left by
this decline and to organize and amplify the collective voice of low-wage, largely immigrant
workers. These worker centers seek to rebalance the relative collective bargaining power
between labor and capital in the 21st century economy. Technological advances, globalization,
and the continued growth of the service sector have led to socioeconomic changes that have little
resemblance to the industrial society that existed at the time the labor laws were initially adopted.
In this new work environment, workers toil at poverty wages and in deplorable working
conditions. As employers reconstruct their businesses to reduce payroll costs, workers have been
isolated and left relatively powerless to voice their concerns and assert their rights. It is in this
context that the worker centers have begun to organize the new working class and to push for
local and national enforcement of their rights.
Currently unencumbered by the requirements and limitations under the national labor law
regime, worker centers have been able to deploy tactics that have been denied to traditional labor
unions. Primarily, worker centers are not subject to the prohibition against secondary boycotts
under the NLRA. As such, worker centers have not been stymied by the changing nature of the
employment landscape and decentralized business model. Worker centers have been successful
in applying economic pressure on business entities that, while not in a direct labor dispute with
workers, have significant influence over working conditions. This success has angered business
groups, who have continually called for the NLRB and the Department of Labor to determine
that worker centers are statutory labor organizations that must abide by the same rules as labor
unions. While initial decisions by these agencies suggest that they will not be held to be labor
organizations under the law, the change in administrative tides may bring a drastic change to the
agencies’ interpretations of the labor law provisions and case law precedent.
In this paper, I will present an overview of the current “labor organization” question
being asked by pro-business groups and offer a textual and policy-based argument for why
worker centers should not be held to be statutory labor organizations and required to comply
with the stringent labor law provisions. In enacting the Wagner Act in 1935, Congress
announced the national labor policy: to ensure labor peace through the balancing of bargaining
power between capital and labor, which requires that the rights of labor to organize and to select
a collective bargaining representative be recognized and enforced. While much has changed
since 1935, this is still the stated labor policy of the United States. The service, organizing, and
advocacy conducted by worker centers on behalf of low-wage, immigrant workers furthers this
policy in contemporary times. These organizations utilize the principles and protections inherent
in the labor laws to improve the bargaining position of low-wage workers and to hold employers
accountable for violations of the labor law protections. Requiring worker centers to comply with
the law’s restrictions on tactics and reporting and disclosure requirements would inhibit the
flexibility and experimentation that has been key to the success of these groups in countering
capital’s powerful bargaining position. Applying the current labor law regime to worker centers

would not only be inapposite to the terms of the statute, it would be in contravention of the stated
national policy underlying these laws.
Part II will discuss the rise of worker centers to provide a collective voice to marginalized
workers and outline the typical worker center model. Part III will give an overview of American
labor law, which is crucial to understanding why the requirements and prohibitions embedded in
the current form of the National Labor Relations Act would be inappropriate if applied to worker
centers. Part IV will discuss weaknesses under the current labor law regime, including
protections that were not included in the original statutes, the shortcomings NLRA in remedying
violations committed by employers, and weaknesses stemming from changes in the socioeconomic context to which the law has been unable to adapt. Part V provides an overview of
business groups’ response to the worker center movement and the relevance of this response in
the dawn of Trump. In Part VI, I provide an analysis of the “labor organization” question and
offer textual, policy, and constitutional arguments as to why worker centers do not and should
not be considered statutory labor organizations and held to the same restrictive standards as
traditional labor unions.
II.

Worker Centers: A New Species of Concerted Activity
A.
The Restaurant Opportunities Center rises from the ashes of tragedy to advocate
on behalf of low-wage restaurant workers
The Restaurant Opportunities Center (ROC) serves as a prime example of and helpful
model to better understand this new species of labor organization as pro-business groups
frequently target ROC in their campaigns to have worker centers fall under the provisions of
current labor laws.1 ROC was originally started as a project of the Hotel Employees and
Restaurant Employees (HERE) local union chapter in New York City in order to further support
the surviving former workers of the Windows on the World restaurant in the World Trade Center
who lost their jobs after the September 11th terrorist attack.2 In 2003, ROC, under the leadership
of Saru Jayaraman, established itself as an independent organization to represent low-wage,
largely “back of the house” restaurant workers.3 The tragedy of September 11th helped to bring
the working conditions of the restaurant industry to national attention and served as a rallying
point for ROC to engage industry members and the general public to demand better enforcement
of labor and employment laws as well as more protective legislation.4
The initial mission of ROC was to assist former employees of the Windows on the World
in looking for new jobs and obtaining relief support.5 However, an opportunity to establish itself
as the voice of the restaurant worker soon arose when the owner of the Windows on the World
opened a new restaurant and refused to hire his former employees.6 After organizing a protest
1

Thomas I.M. Gottheil, No Part of the Bargain: Worker Centers and Labor Law in Sociohistorical Context, 89
N.Y.U. L. REV. 2228, 2261 (2014)
2
Id.; Saru Jayaraman, From Triangle Shirtwaist to Windows on the World: Restaurants as the New Sweatshops, 14
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 625, 640 (2011).
3
Gottheil, supra note 1 at 2261.
4
See Jayaraman, supra note 2 at 639 (explaining that most of the Windows employees who perished on September
11th were low-wage immigrant workers. As the government-funded Victim Compensation Fund distributed money
to families based on victim’s income and age, the deaths of these workers left their families with very little in terms
of compensation). The Windows employees “had worked at the highest grossing restaurant in the United States, but
had earned between $200 and $300 weekly….” Id.
5
Id. at 640.
6
Id.

outside of the new restaurant that received a lot of publicity, the owner agreed to hire the
Windows workers.7 In response to this success, restaurant workers began to flock to ROC to help
them address violations in their workplaces.8 Since then, ROC has grown into a national worker
center with local affiliates in 8 states as of 2011.9
Today, ROC conducts participatory research and organizes restaurant workers to lobby
local and national legislatures to adopt more protective legislation on issues including minimum
wage and paid sick leave.10 Choosing to target upscale, fine dining establishments to enhance the
public interest of their campaigns, ROC conducts “high profile campaigns against exploitation in
fine dining restaurant companies”.11 A large part of what ROC does centers on litigation against
violating employers for wage theft, discrimination, dangerous work conditions, and other
violations of the employment and labor laws.12 Litigation is usually supplemented with public
demonstrations, which usually result in employers settling disputes out of court by agreeing to
reinstatement, back wages, and the promise “to take affirmative steps to ensure compliance with
the law in the future.”13 ROC attempts to involve its members in every step of the litigation to
further member leadership and active participation.14 Additionally, ROC provides leadership
development programs and works to promote the “high road” to profitability by partnering with
“responsible” employers.15 Membership within ROC is treated as a privilege, conditioning help
with an employment issue with a requirement to attend educational classes on employment,
health, and safety rights.16
The stated mission of ROC is “to improve wages and working conditions for the nation’s
restaurant workforce.17 Citing the size and strength of the National Restaurant Association, ROC
founder Saru Jayaraman describes restaurant workers’ weak bargaining position and vulnerable
social and economic position as the genesis of ROC’s independent identity.18 Restaurant
workers, who tended to be low-wage immigrant workers, “faced conditions of poverty wages,
shaved hours, lack of lunch breaks, health and safety hazards, discrimination and more”.19
Through its flexible strategies, member-oriented practices, and emphasis on industry
cooperation, ROC serves as a “powerful national vehicle for restaurant workers to lift their

7

Id.
Id. at 641.
9
Id.
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See id. at 640; Gottheil, supra note 1 at 2261.
11
Jayaraman, supra note 2 at 641.
12
See Gottheil, supra note 1 at 2261-62.
13
Id. at 2262.
14
Id.
15
Jayaraman, supra note 2 at 641. See also RESTAURANT OPPORTUNITIES CENTER UNITED, http://rocunited.org/ourwork/#promoting-the-high-road (last visited Apr. 8, 2018) (“Engaging employers through our “high road” employer
association RAISE, which provides: training, technical assistance, and a peer network of like-minded employers
following the high road to profitability, which includes higher wages and working conditions for those employed at
their restaurants; leadership development and civic engagement opportunities; research and communications work
that documents the benefits for all three stakeholders of taking the high road and more.”).
16
Gottheil, supra note 1 at 2262.
17
RESTAURANT OPPORTUNITIES CENTER UNITED, http://rocunited.org/about-us/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2018).
18
Jayaraman, supra note 2 at 636.
19
Id.
8

collective voice”20 to bring labor and employment law noncompliance to national attention and
force State involvement in “labour standards enforcement”.21
B.
Community organizations respond to the needs of low wage workers
Without exception, the literature on worker centers is based on the findings of a survey22
conducted by Janice Fine with the support of the Neighborhood Funders Group and the
Economic Policy Institute published in 2006. The survey offers an in-depth analysis of the
history and common features of worker centers, enabling academics and other interested parties
to define this relatively recent phenomena. While this study remains incredibly useful today, it
would be appropriate for a follow up study in the near future to document any changes in the
composition, overall mission, and organizing strategies of these groups. As the question of
whether an entity is a labor organization under the NLRA or LMRDA has been a fact intensive
inquiry, it will be important to have up-to-date information on both the explicit purpose of
worker centers and the activities undertaken by these groups. With this caveat, I have
summarized some of the key findings of the 2006 study below that are most relevant to this
paper.
“Worker centers are community-based mediating institutions that provide support to low
wage workers.”23 Worker centers generally have non-profit tax exempt status and largely run on
the financial support of charitable foundations.24 As reported, there were 137 worker centers as
of 2005, and 122 of the worker centers primarily served immigrant workers.25 While these
worker centers may have their roots in different types of social and civil organizations, Janice
Fine found that worker centers in general have a common origin story. In the most general sense,
worker centers have emerged to fill the void in the “decline of institutions that historically
provided workers with a vehicle for collection action”, and immigrant work centers in particular
have emerged in response to the influx of immigrant workers and the absence of social
institutions to serve the needs of this group.26 Worker centers started out as NGOs, social service
organizations, churches, legal aid societies, and university organizations, and have transformed
into the complex and dynamic institutions that they are today due to a “common desire for a
local organization that would provide services, conduct advocacy, and encourage organizing on
the part of low-wage workers in the absence of anything else.”27
Janice Fine describes the common origin story of a majority of worker centers as starting
with a “catalyzing event” that sent workers in search of a support organization:
“These workers and the allies they find to help them then try to figure out how to
address the immediate situation but often discover that the particular issue they
have confronted is emblematic of a much larger problem, and one that no existing
20

Id. at 640.
See Janice Fine, New Forms to Settle Old Scores: Updating the Worker Centre Story in the United States, 66
RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES 604, 614 (2011) (discussing the work of worker centers in general in publicizing
employer violations of current labor law standards and advocating for better government enforcement).
22
JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS: ORGANIZING COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF A DREAM (2006).
23
Id. at 2.
24
See Fine, supra note 21 at 606; Jarol B. Manheim, THE EMERGING ROLE OF WORKER CENTERS IN UNION
ORGANIZING: AN UPDATE AND SUPPLEMENT, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 57 (2017) (finding that worker centers
depend almost entirely on donations from “progressive activist foundations” while traditional labor organizations
have “kept at arm’s length” from these new organizations).
25
Id. at 3.
26
Id. at 14.
27
Id. at 14-15.
21

organization is addressing. In this way, a host of ethnic NGOs, churches, legal aid
centers, social service agencies, and university communities have almost literally
‘backed into’ organizing and advocating for low-wage workers. They did so upon
discovering that a service approach was simply not enough and that there was a
void in terms of institutions for collective action among low-wage workers. As
widely as these institutions differ from one another in form and function, most
seem to have settled on the worker center model when their existing programs and
strategies proved inadequate.”28
This origin story shared by many worker centers reflects a history of flexibility, adaptation, and
ability to recognize and accommodate unmet needs of low wage workers. As will be discussed
below, the activities and strategies carefully selected by worker centers allows for this flexibility
that allows worker centers to service a new class of workers that traditional unions have been
unable to organize.
C.
Worker centers: A national survey
By offering a combination of services, advocacy projects, and organizing opportunities,
worker centers distinguish themselves from other community centers and social service groups.29
Worker centers have become an important feature in immigrant communities, serving as
“gateway organizations that are meeting immigrant workers where they are and providing them
with a wealth of information and training.”30 Worker centers may take various approaches to
their work depending on the needs of the workers in the communities they serve31, but, as Janice
Fine discovered in her study, worker centers engage in a lot of the same activities and have a lot
of features in common.32 First, most worker centers offer individualized legal services to workers
in helping them to file claims against their employer with government agencies.33 Worker centers
provide education services to community members, including “know your rights” information
materials and support in various languages34, ESL instruction, advocacy and organizing training,
and leadership development. These institutions lead both policy campaigns and direct economic
campaigns directed at government officials and industry members.35 Many worker centers

28

Id. at 15.
Id. at 2 (defining the service, advocacy, and organizing work of worker centers as: “Service delivery: providing
legal representation to recover unpaid wages; English classes; worker rights education; access to health clinics, bank
accounts, and loans. Advocacy: researching and releasing exposés about conditions in low-wage industries, lobbying
for new laws and changes in existing ones, working with government agencies to improve monitoring and grievance
processes, and bringing suits against employers. Organizing: building ongoing organizations and engaging in
leadership development among workers to take action on their own for economic and political change.”
30
Id. at 5.
31
Id. at 20 (explaining that 56% of the worker centers surveyed performed industry-specific organizing where they
assisted workers in the creation of organizations focused on improving wages and working conditions within a
specific industry in a particular geographic area; 44% of centers surveyed did not engage in industry-specific
organizing and instead worked with workers across industries in a particular geographic area to address non-industry
specific issues).
32
Id. at 12.
33
Id. at 78 (explaining the process by which worker centers seek to assist individuals with their grievances against
their employers, which begins with the worker centers reaching out directly with the employer to discuss the claim.
If this proves unsuccessful, the legal staff members at worker centers will help workers fill out complaint forms,
gather the necessary documentation to support their claim, and file the complaint with state and federal agencies).
34
Id. at 75, 77.
35
See infra notes 98-106.
29

engage in direct economic action against individual employers on behalf of workers36, and they
may organize industry level or sectoral direct economic action campaigns if appropriate. Most
worker centers also serve an important function as immigrant rights advocates in their
communities as well as on a broader social level.37
Second, while worker centers vary in their program offerings and strategic decisionmaking, most share some common features in addition to offering a combination of service,
advocacy, and organizing efforts38:
• “Place-based rather than work-site based:” Unlike traditional labor unions, worker
centers are not worksite-based and do not focus their activities toward any particular
employer or workplace. Worker centers do not seek to be the exclusive collective
bargaining representative of any group of workers, and therefore do not seek to establish
majority support within any individual employer.
• “Strong ethnic and racial identification:” While some worker centers seek to assist
workers within a particular industry, many worker centers organize along ethnic or racial
lines. These worker centers understand that issues of race and ethnicity intersect with
economic and social issues in important ways and seek to address this.
• “Leadership development and internal democracy:” Most worker centers make worker
participation a central feature of their organization, and they strive to involve members in
all decision making. To accomplish this, many centers provide leadership development
programs that train workers on how to meaningfully participate in the activities of the
center.
• “A broad agenda:” While employment issues are the primary focus of many worker
centers, these institutions have taken a broader approach to serving their communities and
often respond to the various social, political, health, legal, education, and housing issues
of their members.
• “Coalition building:” Worker centers have joined both formal and informal alliances with
other community organizations, government agencies, and traditional unions.
• “Small and involved memberships:” Most worker centers “view membership as a
privilege that is not automatic but must be earned” and require workers to complete
classes or workshops on worker rights in order to become a member.
In general, worker centers face a difficult dilemma with respect to the services they
decide to provide to community members. There is a concern among contemporary community
organizations that “doing for others” is inefficient as it diverts attention and resources away from
achieving the long-term benefits of “teaching them to do for themselves.”39 Worker centers have
made a conscious choice to focus on long-term change and social transformation, which is
dependent on social justice reform and improved economic policies.40 The goal of worker centers
is to promote collective action approaches to change by showing workers that “the solution to
their situation requires collective action to alter the relations of power and win concrete
36

Id. at 81 (often times, worker centers will supplement or substitute for litigation against an employer by
organizing pickets or boycotts of violating employers involving the workers of the employer as well as other
supporters. Worker centers often use these direct action campaigns to garner media attention).
37
Id. at 12.
38
Id. at 13-14.
39
Id. at 72.
40
Id.

victories.”41 However, worker centers also realize that workers, particularly immigrant workers,
are struggling now and the promise of far-off change does little to alleviate the poor working
conditions and oppressive employment situations these workers find themselves in.42 Without the
worker centers, many of these workers would not have access to legal redress for their
employment issues. Additionally, the provision of services helps to attract new workers to the
worker center and establishes the legitimacy of the worker centers within the low wage,
immigrant worker community.43 Lastly, the legal services offered by worker centers enable these
organizations to collect data and cultivate compelling worker narratives that will be used in the
centers’ advocacy campaigns to win the sympathy of government officials and the general
public.44
The organizing activities of worker centers can be described as falling into one of two
categories, although campaigns often fall into both categories: “economic action organizing” and
“public policy organizing”.45 In their economic action organizing, worker centers have sought to
address head on the obstacles subcontracting and decentralized production schemes pose to
organizing and work to “unpack the production chain in order to identify the real powers-that-be
in an industry and force them to take responsibility for their subcontractors’ behavior.”46
Through lawsuits, local pickets and protests, national boycott campaigns, and carefully crafted
settlement agreements, worker centers have successfully “extend[ed] culpability up the
production chain from subcontractors to manufacturers and retailers.”47 To further help breach
the “structural mismatch between the approach to union organizing specified by the Act and the
approach that makes sense for workers in the low wage economy”48, worker centers partner with
government agencies to strengthen the enforcement mechanisms of existing laws and to advocate
for new industry or sectoral level regulation and policy changes.49
In addition to public policy organizing in pursuit of improved enforcement of current
labor protections and of policy changes to address issues that are not properly addressed under
existing labor law, worker centers engage in other forms of public policy organizing at the local
and national level to address issues that can be broadly categorized as social justice reform50,

41

Id. at 73.
Id. at 72.
43
Id. (“It is in the context of their dual oppression as workers and immigrants, the long-term nature of solutions, and
pressing short term needs that the majority of worker centers have come around to the necessity of service
delivery.”).
44
Id. at 79.
45
Id. at 101.
46
Id. at 102-03.
47
Id. at 103-04 (using the campaign the Garment Worker Center waged against the Forever 21 label in the early
2000s as an example of the tactics used by worker centers to put economic pressure on business entities in positions
of power and control over the terms and conditions of the workers in the bottom-most level of the production chain).
48
Id. at 161 (“The NLRA…was designed with large, stable employers and worksites in mind, which unions, it was
presumed, would organize and bargain with on a single-employer basis. But many low-wage workers have small
and diffuse worksites, and they are employed by businesses in highly competitive industries who very often cannot
act on their own to raise wages and improve working conditions because they would be at a severe competitive
disadvantage. In these situations, low-wage workers need multi-employer bargaining on a geographic/industrial, or
chain-of-production/business network basis.”).
49
Id. at 162, 171.
50
Id. at 191 ([M]any worker centers do not focus exclusively on labor and employment issues—or immigration
issues. Their broad ‘social justice’ agendas mandate that they also organize around racism and domestic violence,
education and youth, housing and development, and health care issues.”)
42

with immigration reform being a primary topic.51 To worker centers, workers’ fight against
discrimination, xenophobia, and racism are just as important and in need of collective actionbased strategies as their wage and conditions of work-based issues.52 Worker centers actively
participate in local and national immigrant rights coalitions through protests and rallies, activities
that resemble those conducted in economic action organizing.53
On a final note regarding the common features of worker centers, the internal structure of
worker centers may vary depending on the goals of the organization and the financial resources
available but are similar in that the internal governance and organization style is flexible and
highly influenced by centers’ long-term orientation. As worker centers tend to focus on future
economic and social transformation, they subsequently devote a lot of time and energy on
cultivating the internal life of their group and on developing the leadership potential of their
members.54 Worker centers strive to establish and maintain internal democracy, encouraging
high levels of participation in center programming and decision making.55 Unlike traditional
labor unions, membership in worker centers is not based on dues56 or of signing representation
cards. Rather, membership is a privilege to be earned through participation and becoming
educated in the realm of workers’ rights.57
D.
Relationship between worker centers and traditional labor unions
Worker centers have varying relationships with traditional labor unions, where some
worker centers work independently of unions and some centers work in collaboration with
unions on industry or sector based organizing drives.58 Across these diverse relationships, the
underlying reality is that worker centers and traditional unions are different. Culture differences
exist between these two types of groups, with worker centers viewing labor unions as being
undemocratic, top-down, and unresponsive to the needs of community members.59 Unions view
worker centers as “undisciplined and unrealistic about what it takes to win.”60 Where unions
have an established process for governing their organization and for structuring negotiations with
employers, worker centers remain flexible in their approach to organizing, experimenting with
new tactics based on the needs of its members.61 With these core differences, many worker
centers and unions were initially hostile toward each other and were “explicitly rejectionist” of
the activities of the other.62

51

Id. at 180 (“Many worker centers view their work as much through a social justice frame—championing the rights
of immigrants and people of color generally—as they do through a workers’ rights frame.”).
52
Id.
53
Id. at 188.
54
Id. at 201.
55
Id. at 202-03.
56
At the time the survey was conducted, dues were not seen by the majority of worker centers as being a central part
of their overall budget. Id. at 221. The study revealed several reasons for why worker centers were not collecting or
relying on dues to support their activities, ranging from moral opposition to the concept of paying for membership to
a lack of internal structure to collect and process dues. Id. at 221-22. Rather, worker centers rely primarily on
charitable donations from large foundations. Id. at 218.
57
Id. at 210.
58
Id. at 120.
59
Id. at 124.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Janice Fine, New Forms to Settle Old Scores: Updating the Worker Centre Story in the United States, 66
RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES 604, 617 (2011).

However, the more recent trend has been toward a symbiotic relationship between unions
and worker centers in the form of partnerships and collaborations.63 Due to their greater
resources and experiences in organizing workers, unions offer guidance, infrastructure support,
and financial support to worker centers.64 Worker centers in turn will often help workers connect
with local unions in the community to address their individual service needs, as worker centers
have had more success than unions in organizing the low-wage, immigrant communities.65 In a
later article written to update and supplement her initial 2006 study, Janice Fine indicated a
growing trend toward federation whereby “strong individual centres have joined existing
national networks or formed new ones which have, in turn, helped to establish new organizations
or affiliate existing ones.”66 Worker centers have utilized their expanding networks to leverage
collective power in campaigning for “global worker justice, immigrant rights, the rights to
organize for workers historically excluded from collective bargaining rights and the right to
decent work and living conditions in America’s cities.”67
Janice Fine has commented that the success of worker centers in “the largely non-union
service economy, low-end construction, meatpacking, light manufacturing…and in industries
and among constituencies unions had given up long ago as too difficult to organize” is due in
large part to the fact that worker centers are not constrained by the current labor law scheme.68
Unlike traditional unions, worker centers have not been “stripped… of some of their most potent
tactics”.69 As such, worker centers are able to act as “organizing laboratories”, testing out new
strategies and techniques for organizing low-wage workers.70 In Part VI.B.2, I will argue that
applying the provisions and strictures of the current labor law scheme would limit the
effectiveness of worker centers in engaging employers in ways that extend beyond the
permissible limits under the law to combat the new challenges facing low-wage workers in the
21st century economy.
III.
The Long and Short of American Labor Law: From the Wagner Act to the
Landrum Griffin Act
The current labor law regime, encapsulated by the National Labor Relations Act and its
subsequent amendments, has not been substantially updated since 1959. As will be discussed in
Part II of this paper, the labor laws as interpreted and applied have proven to be ineffectual in
protecting the rights of workers to organize and act for mutual aid or protection in recent years.
However, there is much to be gleaned from the history of these laws and the underlying policy
decisions. The issues Congress found to be widespread and sought to address in passing the
NLRA in 1935 are very much alive today. The stated goal of empowering workers by equalizing
bargaining power between capital and labor offers support to the argument that worker centers
should remain free from the restraints of an ill-suited labor regime in order to assist low wage
workers who, like the blue-collar workforce of the 1930s, have been unable to enforce their
rights against the power of capital.
63

Id.
Janice Fine, Alternative Labour Protections Movements in the United States: Reshaping Industrial Relations?,
154 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR REVIEW 15, 19 (2015).
65
Id.
66
Fine, supra note 21 at 615.
67
Id. at 620.
68
Id. at 606, 609.
69
Id. at 606.
70
Id.
64

A.
Wagner Act promises workers a place at the bargaining table
Despite the productivity and prosperity that characterized post-WWI America, the bluecollar working class did not equally share in this abundance71. Following a boom in consumeroriented industries and consumer products, many of America’s working class found themselves
unable to partake in the consumption and began to struggle to support themselves and their
families72. The position of American workers became even more desperate as America and the
rest of the world entered the Great Depression after the stock market crash of 1929. A master
orator, President Franklin Roosevelt articulated the needs of America’s workers as being a need
for both freedom from want and from the oppression of industrial tyranny73. In support for the
National Industrial Recovery Act, an early attempt to address the labor unrest, President
Roosevelt framed the purpose of government interference in labor relations as being “to restore
our rich domestic market by raising its vast consuming capacity.”74 A particular “American”
standard of living was being posited as a right of citizenship, where freedom from want was to be
as respected as the “classically liberal freedoms of religion and speech.”75
Even prior to the start of the Great Depression, there was a view held by some radicals
that a great contradiction existed between capitalism and democracy. Where outside of the realm
of corporate America values of personal autonomy and democratic participation were lauded,
these values were often punished and prohibited inside of private enterprises.76 President
Roosevelt, aware of the need for a national movement for industrial democracy, stated that “‘[a]
small group had concentrated into their own hands an almost complete control over other
people’s property, other people’s money, other people’s labor—other people’s lives. For too
many of us life was no longer free; liberty was no longer real; men could no longer follow the
pursuit of happiness.’”77 As such, it was the duty of modern government to insure that the rights
of American citizenship, “due process, free speech, the right of assembly and petition”, were
enforced in the workplace so that labor and capital were equals.78
Incorporating protections set out in previous labor laws and addressing the loopholes that
employers had exploited in previous acts, the Wagner Act of 1935, officially titled the National
Labor Relations Act, identified the core collective action rights of workers and prohibited
company-dominated unions as well as any other employer promulgated unfair labor practice
designed to interfere with the exercise of workers’ rights under the act.79 Section 7 of the NLRA,
inspired in large part by Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, insured workers
the “right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection”.80 The act’s restrictions and
prohibitions were entirely aimed at employers, and it explicitly forbid employers to restrict,
71

See MELVYN DUBOFSKY & FOSTER R. DULLES, LABOR IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 223 (2010) (“Many segments of
labor did not appear to have been invited to the feast plenty that was provided by economic expansion, and even
those groups of workers who profited most from the upward trend of wages could still feel that their share of the
awards of prosperity were by no means commensurate with the far greater profits being made by businessmen.”).
72
NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR 22-23 (Rev. ed. 2013).
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Id. at 25-32.
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coerce, or in any way interfere with employees’ exercise of their protected rights.81 The
justification of the overtly pro-labor lean was that “only through government support could labor
meet management on anything like equal terms in an industrialized society, and that the time had
come when the scales, always so heavily weighted in favor of industry, should be redressed in
favor of the workers.”82
This policy was written directly into Section 1 of the NLRA. Summarizing Congress’
findings regarding the labor unrest common at the time, Section 1 states that industrial strife and
the resulting disruption in the free flow of commerce was due in part to “[t]he inequality of
bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual
liberty of contract and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership
association”.83 Section 1 declares it to be the national policy to eliminate and monitor causes of
industrial strife by protecting the exercise of employees’ rights to “self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.”84 Congress’ value
determinations and policy choices toward national labor relations in this moment in time were
consistently articulated in statements made about the NLRA, in the NLRA itself, and in the
monumental Supreme Court decision validating Congress’ authority and respecting its decision.
Despite a tradition of hostility toward previous labor laws, the Supreme Court upheld the
NLRA against a constitutional challenge in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation.85 In
writing for the majority, Chief Justice Hughes summarized the labor policy that Congress, as
well as the Court, had come to adopt, a statement encompassing the formal position of the United
States toward workers’ rights:
“Thus, in its present application, the statute goes no further than to safeguard the
right of employees to self-organization and to select representatives of their own
choosing for collective bargaining or other mutual protection without restraint or
coercion by their employer. That is a fundamental right. Employees have as clear
a right to organize and select their representatives for lawful purposes as the
respondent has to organize its business and select its own officers and
agents…Long ago, we stated the reason for labor organizations. We said that they
were organized out of the necessities of the situation; that a single employee was
helpless in dealing with an employer; that he was dependent ordinarily on his
daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family; that, if the employer
refused to pay him the wages he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave
the employ and resist arbitrary and unfair treatment; that union was essential to
give laborers opportunity to deal on an equality with their employer.”86
While the current labor scheme has been amended with a more favorable treatment of business
interests,87 the underlying principles have remained the same. Congress codified the importance
of striking a balance between the relative power of labor and capital. As Chief Justice Hughes
commented, the situation before Congress in 1935 necessitated government intervention on
behalf of workers who were deemed to be helpless and powerless absent the legal protections of
81
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their right to organize and collectively act for mutual aid and support. As I will argue in Part
VI.B, the current situation demands action to elevate workers to an equal bargaining position as
employers. Abiding by the policy choices articulated in the passing of the NLRA, Congress, the
Department of Labor, and the NLRB should recognize the weakened bargaining power of lowwage workers and facilitate, or at least refuse to inhibit, the worker centers that have emerged to
reassert the rights of workers vis a vis offending employers.
B.
Increase in anti-union sentiment leads to the Taft Hartley Act
As industry commenced a reconversion of its facilities to adjust to peacetime production
after WWII, workers found themselves being laid off in large numbers or taking home smaller
wages.88 Determined not to lose the gains it had achieved during the war, organized labor
engaged in a series of strikes, constituting what has been called the “1945-1946 Strike Wave”.89
This wave of labor unrest intensified a pre-existing anti-union drive among those, particularly in
the corporate community, who felt the Wagner Act had made the labor unions too powerful as it
imposed no restrictions on labor.90 Through propaganda campaigns, business labeled unions as
selfish special interest groups who operated against the public interest.91 As agitation for an
amendment to the balance of power in the Wagner Act grew and organized labor remained
steadfast in its opposition to any change to the act, the Taft Hartley Act, legislation “heavily
slanted against labor organizations”, was passed in 1947 over President Truman’s veto.92
The Taft Hartley Act, which became known later on as the Labor Management Relations
Act of 194793, amended the Wagner Act to include protections for managerial rights and to
“provide workers the same protections from labor organizations that the Wagner Act offered
from employers.”94 For the purposes of this paper, the act’s restriction on secondary boycotts is
the most relevant. Secondary boycotts have been described as “protests or pickets by a union
against a business with which it does not have an actual or potential bargaining relationship”.95
The restriction against secondary boycotts is relevant because this form of boycott or picket is a
powerful tactic, exerting economic pressure on an employer by directing action against another
entity that does business with the employer. As explained in Part II, worker centers have
successfully utilized this strategy to bring economic pressure against an entity that lies further up
the supply chain or that has created distance between itself and the workers in question through a
subcontracting relationship. The prohibition on secondary boycotts under the Taft Hartley Act
applies only to statutory labor organizations, meaning that worker centers could lose access to
88
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this effective tactic if they are deemed to fall within the NLRA’s definition of “labor
organization”.
C.
Landrum Griffin Act attempts to address public concerns of union corruption
While the Taft Hartley Act placed some significant restraints on the activities of unions,
it did not include any provisions regarding the internal governance of unions. As public concern
was aroused by stories of union corruption, Congress turned its focus to the internal affairs of
labor unions.96 In 1957, the Senate established a Select Commission on Improper Activities in
the Labor or Management Field, which was to be led by Senator John McClellan.97 The
McClellan Committee revealed a starker image than anticipated, with various accounts of
election fraud, racketeering, embezzlement and misuse of union funds, collusion between union
officials and employers, and overall “union dictatorship”.98 The testimony implicated only a
handful of unions, including the mighty Teamsters Union as well as some smaller-scale unions;
however, the allegations of corruption were sufficient to cloak all of organized labor in
suspicion.99 After the committee submitted its report, Congress passed the Landrum-Griffin Act,
or the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) of 1959.100 The final act has
been described as a compromise between reformers who sought an increase in internal union
democracy and labor critics who saw this as an opportunity to weaken labor.101
Title I of the LMRDA, a form of Bill of Rights for workers, outlines fundamental rights
of workers vis a vis their union.102 Title II requires labor organizations to disclose financial
information regarding the organization and its officials to organization members, and it dictates
that labor organizations create and maintain a constitution and bylaws detailing the structural,
governance, and financial mechanisms in place.103 Additionally, Title II requires labor
organizations to submit this information, as well as other disclosure forms, to the Department of
Labor’s Office of Labor Management Standards (OLMS).104 Title IV specifies the election
requirements for organization officials, mandating that elections occur at specific times and by
secret ballot.105 Title V creates a fiduciary duty on the part of organization officials to members
with respect to the organization’s funds.106
In addition to the detailed reporting and disclosure requirements, the LMRDA also served
to further restrict the lawful actions of labor organizations. The prohibition against secondary
boycotts was expanded to “prevent a union from bringing any pressure to bear on an employer to
make him cease doing business with another employer.”107 Additionally, the act amended the
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NLRA to include Section 8(b)(7) in the list of prohibited unfair labor practices. The new
prohibition restricted picketing “for organizational or recognitional purposes by a union for more
than 30 days if it has not filed a petition with the NLRB to represent the workers.”108
Based on the literature written about the LMRDA with regards to worker centers, there
are two issues to note at this juncture. First, the reporting requirements, intended to implement
and safeguard internal democracy within labor organizations, seemed to have been based on an a
“particular notion of institutional democracy” where “representative democracy is taken as a
given.”109 Second, the LMRDA’s legislative history indicates that there was some concern that
the stringent and intrusive regulations on the internal governance of private labor organizations
raised freedom of association issues.110 However, the enactment of the LMRDA indicates that a
majority thought the “interference was justified in response to the specific problems identified by
the Committee”, i.e. corruption and lack of internal democracy.111 I will return to this idea of the
perceived justification for infringing on a private organization’s freedom of association in Part
VI.B.3, where I will pose the argument that the proffered justification for the intrusion on labor
unions is not present in the context of worker centers.
IV.

The Decline in Workers’ Bargaining Power
The recent literature on the decline in traditional labor unions and the rise of worker
centers and other alt-labor groups have cited the courts, employers, and the changing socioeconomic landscape as the primary reasons for why labor law is currently failing to adequately
protect the rights of workers, particularly low-wage immigrant workers, to organize and act in
mutual aid or protection.112 While the NLRA has proven to be ineffective in both its stated
protections and in its remedial scheme, the interpretations by the courts and subsequent
amendments by Congress have served to grant employers greater protections over matters
deemed to be managerial prerogatives. Consequently, the balance in bargaining power between
labor and capital that Congress sought to reach through the Wagner Act has been upended with a
thumb on the scales in favor of employers. Beyond the issues with the letter and spirit of the
current labor law scheme, the changing social and economic dynamics since the time of the law’s
passing have provided additional opportunities for employers to avoid unionization and have
contributed to the creation of a new vulnerable class of workers.
A.
Weaknesses in the structure and interpretation of the NLRA as employers are able
to evade the worker protections of the statute
For a time after its initial enactment, the NLRA did accomplish what is set out to do,
which was to elevate workers to an even playing field with employers by protecting their right to
organize. However, some limitations inherent in the statute are worth noting. The statute does
not cover all workers, leaving some large categories of workers unprotected. In defining the term
“employees” as covered under the act, § 2(3) states
“[B]ut shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in
the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual
employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an
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independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any
individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as
amended from time to time, or by any other person who is not an employer as
herein defined.”
Additionally, the amendments to the act, the Taft Hartley Act and the Landrum-Griffin Act,
further restrained the potential effectiveness of labor organizations in representing workers and
enforcing their rights by prohibiting certain economic strategies and placing intrusive
requirements on the formal governance and reporting of the entity. The Supreme Court has also
weakened the protections of the NLRA in its interpretations of the act, some of which were later
codified in the amendments to the NLRA, that “undercut the Act’s protection of the right to
strike, made it easier for employers to oppose union campaigns, and generally shored up
managerial rights of control over the workplace.”113
Employers have also found ways, both legal and illegal, to bypass the primary employee
protections of the NLRA. With decisions by the Supreme Court that established the employer’s
right to hire permanent replacements for striking workers and limited the scope of the mandatory
subjects for collective bargaining, excluding “matters of entrepreneurial judgment”, employers
have been able to avoid unionization by either subcontracting peripheral activities or by shutting
down and relocating production.114 It has been argued that employers seeking to resist
unionization are able to exploit the NLRA’s ineffective enforcement mechanisms, weak penalties
for violations, and lengthy process delays.115
The weak penalties built into the NLRA do not properly disincentivize employers from
violating employees’ rights to act collectively for their mutual aid and protection.116 If
successful in a claim alleging termination in retaliation for collective activity, workers are
eligible for back pay but are not entitled to punitive damages.117 In these retaliation cases,
employees have an obligation to mitigate the damage from lost wages by seeking new
employment in the meantime, further reducing the financial penalty on violating employers.118
For some workers, reinstatement may be an available remedy, but the proceedings have proven
to be costly, drawn out, and ineffective.119 According to Professor Andrias of University of
Michigan Law School, the median time between the filing of an unfair labor practice charge and
the issuance of a final order from the NLRB approximates 500 days.120 Considering the low
probability and low cost of getting caught, the potential gains for taking illegal actions to prevent
unionization are compelling reasons to disregard the law. Previous studies suggested that
employers were capitalizing on this opportunity to refuse unionization.121 The NLRA is also
limited in its ability to implement its stated goal to protect and facilitate collective bargaining. As
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the NLRA cannot impose its own terms if a party to negotiations fails to bargain in good faith
under the act, the good faith bargaining requirement has very little bite.122
B.
An increasingly fissured economy brings changes in workforce structure and
composition, as well as a precarious situation for low wage immigrant workers
The dawn of the fissured economy123 and the rise of an increasingly contingent workforce
have provided employers with additional opportunities to avoid the burden and cost of
complying with the NLRA, and these law avoiding tactics, clearly in violation of the spirit of the
labor laws, have not been deemed to be a technical violation of the law.
Inherent in the NLRA is a particular model of employment centered on the relationship
between an individual employer and its employees.124 The current labor law scheme was created
during the New Deal-era and subsequently reflects the industrial economy of the time where blue
collar workers, largely white males, enjoyed relatively secure fulltime employment with a single
industrial employer and sought to bargain collectively with this employer as a way of expressing
their collective voice.125 However, this model no longer accurately reflects the realities of the 21st
century economy and workforce, reducing the ability of the labor law scheme to address the
problems facing workers in the modern era.
Starting in the 1970s, the American economy responded to increased domestic and
international competition with a process that has been called “deindustrialization”.126 American
businesses reshaped themselves in an effort to adapt to the new age of international competitors
successfully capturing the market on higher value, low-priced products in the mass production
industries.127 As capital began to move overseas, employment in manufacturing and industrial
sectors contracted and employment in the service sectors, those largely unaffected by global
competition, expanded.128 During this period, there was an increasing trend in economic
fissuring whereby businesses focus on the core activities of the company and slough off all
peripheral activities by entering subcontracting relationships with domestic or international
companies.129 In subcontracting a particular project or an entire job, businesses “can take
advantage of the downward pressure facing smaller companies that compete to win bids for those
jobs.”130 Additionally, businesses began to move away from the idea of fulltime, permanent
employment and toward a free agent conception of employment, limiting the number of full time
122
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employees on the payroll and increasing their use of “contingent workers”.131 Through these
changes in the structure of the workplace, employers have been able to shift the risk of increased
competition to this new class of contingent, low-wage workers.132
While employers restructured their businesses for both efficiency and financial reasons, a
primary motivation behind the economic fissuring was to avoid unionization.133 The use of
subcontractors or overseas production facilities for peripheral activities became another
avoidance strategy for employers to ignore current collective bargaining agreements, while
tactics like permanently replacing strikers or closing a plant and opening non-union plants in new
locations benefitted employers opposed to the organization attempts of its workers.134 Despite
the interference with employees’ right to organize and bargain collectively, these tactics were
largely upheld by the courts, who seemed to place the managerial and property interests of
employers above the collective action rights of employees.135
Supply chains, subcontracting, franchising, and other nontraditional employment
relationships make unionization near impossible.136 In the case of subcontracting, workers may
be successful in organizing their direct employer but may overall prove fatal to the success of the
supplier company in competing with other, non-unionized supplier companies for bids for
contracts in “low-margin markets”.137 Similar obstacles to effective unionization exist in the
franchisee-franchisor relationship, where employees may be able to effectively organize and
bargain with the franchisee but still be helpless in the face of a franchisor that has significant
control over the terms and conditions of employment and little incentive to negotiate. Downward
pressure on wages in the franchising context creates incentives for franchisees to favor part-time,
low wage positions as a way of avoiding the requirements under federal and state labor and
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employment laws.138 And in all employment contexts, the increased mobility of capital has given
legitimacy to the threat of plant closure as a response to attempts to organize a workplace.139 As
discussed above, the weak enforcement mechanisms of the NLRA fail to disincentive employers
from using this threat, further increasing the obstacles to unionization in mobile industries.
The changing structure of the economy and, in turn, the workforce has limited the impact
of the NLRA as employers are able to organize their businesses so to operate outside of the reach
of the labor laws.140 Of particular relevance for many contingent workers, the NLRA, again
based on the traditional employment model, does not “facilitate collective action across multiple
employers.”141 Organizing drives under the NLRA rely on the majority support of an appropriate
bargaining unit within a single business. Subsequently, it is possible that employees will be
powerless to bargain or negotiate with business entities that have significant control over the
terms and conditions of their employment but are not the employees’ direct employer.142 Finally,
the NLRA places explicit restrictions on employees’ use of multi-employer action in prohibiting
secondary boycotts. Employees cannot participate in or encourage action that places pressure on
one business in order to put economic pressure on an employer, even if the secondary business
and the employer are intertwined, with an exception for joint employers.143 While employers are
free under the NLRA to organize their business in terms of the structure of its workforce and its
working relationships with other employers to best suit their business goals, employees are
restricted by the NLRA in terms of who can be organized and with whom they have a protected
right to bargain over the terms and conditions of their employment.
The changes summarized in this section, as well as recent changes to immigration
patterns, have created a new working class in need of new organizing techniques. Labeled the
“precariat”, this new class of workers consists of precarious workers, or those who lack
employment security and are largely “excluded from the legal protections that the organized
labor movement struggled to achieve.”144 An influx of unauthorized immigrant workers in the
1980s and 1990s aided the rapid growth of the precariat.145 Both authorized and unauthorized
immigrant workers are concentrated in low wage jobs in the service sector, due in part to the fact
that immigrants are frequently relegated to the lower levels of the “employment ladder and
138
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frequently obtain only contingent work.”146 Unauthorized immigrant workers experience an
added layer of vulnerability because of a constant fear of being discovered by immigration
authorities. This fear leads to exploitation by employers who are aware of these workers’ illegal
status and can use this knowledge against workers to prevent them from seeking redress to wage
theft, unsafe working conditions, and other labor and employment law violations.147 The new
precariat, particularly immigrant workers, have been deprived of the labor rights deemed
essential to democracy in the workplace, and therefore democracy in the larger society, and
traditional labor unions have proven inadequate in their attempts to reinstate the balance between
labor and capital in the contemporary social and economic context.
V.

Business’ response: worker centers as fronts for traditional labor unions
A.
Calling foul: Business groups demand NLRB and Department of Labor to review
worker centers
Literature and media stories about worker centers and their place within the current labor
law scheme first began to appear in earnest between 2012 and 2014, with labor critics becoming
more vocal with the rise of worker center protests and broader social movements like the Fight
for $15.148 In 2013, two House Republicans sent a letter to the Department of Labor requesting
that they investigate whether worker centers are covered under the LMRDA and are therefore
required to comply with its mandates.149 A year later, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce published
a report on the leading worker centers, warning employers of prolonged labor unrest from these
rebranded labor unions.150 In its introduction to its report, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
described the worker center movement as a front for labor unions to increase their membership
without complying with burdensome labor law requirements that traditional labor unions must
abide by.151 During this time, Republican members in the House of Representatives and labor
critics claimed that “worker centers, by not registering as unions are wrongfully skirting the
organizing, disclosure, and strike regulations that govern full-fledged unions.”152 For many in the
pro-business camp, the relationship between traditional unions and worker centers is such that
many worker centers were founded by individuals from the traditional labor movement or are
tied closely with labor unions through financial support.153 Business groups have argued that
146
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worker centers should be held to the same reporting and disclosure requirements and activity
prohibitions that labor unions are held to because worker centers perform the same activities as
unions, particularly in putting economic pressure on employers to improve work conditions.154
Perhaps the most substantive argument posed by labor critics as to why the requirements
and restrictions under the NLRA and LMRDA should be applied to worker centers is that these
requirements secure workers’ rights vis a vis their labor representatives and therefore provide
significant protections and benefits to workers.155 The labor laws governing the internal
governance of labor unions were intended to establish the accountability of these organizations
to their members through the “promotion of the principles of organizational democracy, access to
basic information and promotion of a duty of fair representation.”156 If worker centers are not
considered labor organizations required to comply with the strictures of the labor laws, these
organizations will avoid accountability to the workers that they represent. While worker centers
may serve a useful function, “no organization, no matter how laudable its mission, is above
reproach.”157 It is possible the corruption and fraud that tarnished the records of traditional labor
unions could plague worker centers, and compliance with the labor laws should be required to
prevent this possibility from becoming a reality.158
Seeing hope for a pro-business decision from the Trump administration, pro-business
groups have renewed their calls to the NLRB and the DOL to determine the status of worker
centers in relation to the NLRA and the LMRDA. Labor critics have posed the same arguments
they made in 2013 and 2014, primarily that worker centers are rebranded labor unions that have
been permitted to act like unions while “dodging rules” put in place to curb some of these
behaviors.159 Most of the energy of worker center critics has been spent in appealing to the
Department of Labor to apply the LMRDA to worker centers and order them to file the same
financial disclosure forms required of unions.160 In the minds of many business groups, “[i]f it
looks like a union and acts like a union, it should be treated like a union.”161
Business groups and supporting members of Congress may see their calls for scrutiny
come true in the near future, which makes the labor organization question outlined below all the
more relevant. In a hearing before the House Education and the Workforce Committee in
November 2017, Labor Secretary Alexander Acosta, in response to a question from a committee
member, said the department was looking into the legal status of worker centers.162 While there
has been no update or further statements made by the Department of Labor on this matter, there
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is cause for concern for worker centers.163 If applied to worker centers, the requirements and
prohibitions of current labor laws would distort the worker center model and impair the
effectiveness and success these centers have had to the extent that it is due to the flexible,
unrestrained structure.164 Perhaps the greatest threat to worker centers is the risk of losing
unrestrained access to the tactic of secondary boycotting. If § 8(b)(4) of the NLRA were applied
to worker centers, these organizations would lose their ability, and one of their primary strategic
advantages, to target supply chain retailers and other business entities that have real, yet indirect,
influence on the terms and conditions of employment but are not directly engaged in a labor
dispute with the worker center.
VI.
The “Labor Organization” Question: Should Worker Centers Be Treated as
Statutory Labor Organizations under the NLRA and LMRDA?
The debate between capital and labor takes both descriptive and normative forms: do
worker centers fall within the scope of the NLRA and LMRDA and should they? Business
groups agitate for greater scrutiny on worker centers and demand the determination that worker
centers are labor organizations and must abide by the rules under the labor laws. Labor advocates
claim that these centers do not fall under the statutory “labor organization” umbrella and find it
would be inappropriate to apply labor laws developed in one historical context to organizations
working in an entirely different context.
I will argue that, based on previous Board interpretations of the statutory definition of
labor organization, worker centers do not fall within the labor organization definition. In the
event that worker centers begin to develop a pattern or practice of performing activities that push
it over the threshold of a statutorily-defined labor organization, I argue that the labor laws should
still not be applied to these centers. First, worker centers, through their structures and strategies
currently unfettered by antiquated labor law provisions, champion labor policy and goals,
adopted by Congress in 1935, in the modern era. Second, the concerns and intentions underlying
the broad definition of “labor organization” under the NLRA and LMRDA have not been
triggered by the activities of worker centers, negating any policy-based reason to extend the
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definition to include worker centers. Lastly, the differences between labor unions and worker
centers raises constitutional questions concerning the intrusion into the internal governance of
private worker center associations. Both policy and constitutional-based arguments weigh in
favor of refraining from applying the current labor law scheme to worker centers.
A.
Worker centers do not fall within the statutory definition of “labor organization”
Despite the demands of business groups, it is inappropriate to have a brightline rule that
worker centers qualify as labor organizations under the NLRA and LMRDA. As Board decisions
interpreting the statutory definition indicate, the “labor organization” analysis is a fact-intensive
analysis and depends on how the alleged labor organization interacts with the employer. With
that, I would like to caveat the below analysis by noting that it would be useful to have an
updated study of worker centers to see if the detailed survey in 2006 is still reflective of the
current worker center model. Because the 2006 survey provided a wealth of information on the
foundational features and common characteristics of worker centers, it is likely to be an accurate,
relevant portrayal of worker centers. However, having a more recent, in-depth look at the
specific activities the worker centers are engaging in would provide additional support to the
statutory argument that worker centers are not labor organizations.
1.
Labor organization under the NLRA
Although there may be some uncertainty in how the NLRB and Department of Labor, as
well as the courts of appeal, will interpret and apply previous case law on the labor law question,
the current situation as it stands today suggests that worker centers will not be considered labor
organizations as defined by the statutes. “Labor organization” is defined in § 2(5) of the NLRA
as being “any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or
plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of
dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment, or conditions of work.”165 Worker centers will likely satisfy the elements of “any
organization”, employee participation, and concerning grievances, wages, and conditions of
work.166 The labor organization question, therefore, will turn on whether worker centers “exist
for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers”.167
While there have been seminal decisions interpreting the meaning of “dealing with” that
form the bedrock of “dealing with” analysis, the § 2(5) “labor organization” doctrine is far from
clear and consistent. In the literature on the labor organization question, academics differ in how
they view the Board’s jurisprudence on this question, relying on different Board decisions to
support their assessment of the Board’s construction of § 2(5). The fact of the matter is that the
Board’s decisions have lacked consistency and clarity.168 Without having a coherent
understanding of the Board’s historical interpretation of the statutory definition, it is difficult to
predict how the Board will interpret it in the future. Adding to the uncertainty is the fact that the
overwhelming majority of case law constituting the § 2(5) jurisprudence has been in the context
of company-unions. The legal status of worker centers has not been addressed head-on in any
NLRB decision or court of appeals case. As such, it is unclear whether the Board will apply its §
2(5) jurisprudence outside of the company-union context.
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The NLRB’s § 2(5) jurisprudence is founded in the Supreme Court case N.L.R.B. v.
Cabot Carbon.169 The case addressed the question of whether employee committees, established
for the purpose of addressing issues of “mutual interest”170 through monthly meetings with plant
management, were labor organizations under § 2(5).171 In holding that the lower court erred in
finding that the employee committees were not labor organizations under §2(5) “simply because
they did not ‘bargain with’ employers in the ‘usual concept of collective bargaining’”, the Court
established a broad construction of the “dealing with” clause. Recounting the legislative history
of § 2(5), the Court stated that Congress’ conscious choice to include the language “dealing
with” and not “bargaining collectively” indicates that “dealing with” should not be considered to
be synonymous with “bargaining collectively”.172 In addition to enunciating the principle that
organizations may be considered statutory labor organizations in the absence of traditional
collective bargaining, Cabot Carbon also shed some light on how the language of § 2(5) should
be understood and applied. Without specifically articulating the exact analysis to be undertaken,
it is clear the Court examined both the stated purpose of the committees as well as the functions
of the committees in order to determine that the employee committees existed “ for the purpose,
in part at least, ‘of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of
pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.’”173 Therefore, the “dealing with” element of a
§ 2(5) labor organization requires an analysis of both the explicit, stated purpose of the
organization and the implicit purpose of the organization as inferred from the actions of the
organization.
The Board articulated its understanding and interpretation of the “dealing with” language
in § 2(5) in its 1992 decision Electromation, Inc.174 Similar to Cabot Carbon, Electromation was
decided in the context of an employer-dominated employee committee, also known as a
company union. In order to determine whether the employer had violated § 8(a)(2) by
dominating or interfering with the “action committees” in question, the Board needed to first
determine whether these committees fell within the statutory definition of “labor organization”
under § 2(5).175 The Board found that the employer established several action committees,
consisting of volunteer employees and members of management, to meet weekly to discuss
issues such as wages, attendance programs, and leave policy.176 Like the Supreme Court’s
analysis in Cabot Carbon, the Board answered the question of whether the action committees
existed for the purpose of dealing with the employer by looking at the express purpose of the
committees as well as the implicit purpose based on what the committees actually did.177 Under
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this analysis framework, the Board determined that the action committees were created to
“achieve a bilateral solution” to the issues workers complained of, and did indeed create a
bilateral process by which employees and management worked toward “bilateral solutions on the
basis of employee-initiated proposals.”178 This bilateral process to achieve bilateral solutions “is
the essence of ‘dealing with’ within the meaning of § 2(5).”179
The Board further expounded upon its bilateral mechanism refinement in E.I. Du Pont De
Nemours & Co.180 As in both Cabot Carbon and Electromation, this case was based on a
challenge against internal committees composed of both employees and management members
that alleged the committees constituted an employer-dominated labor organization.181 The Board
explained that the term “dealing” indicates a bilateral mechanism, but does not require a
compromise between the two parties.182 Instead, this “‘bilateral mechanism’ ordinarily entails a
pattern or practice in which a group of employees, over time, makes proposals to management,
management responds to these proposals by acceptance or rejection by word or deed….”183 The
“dealing with” prong of the § 2(5) analysis, therefore, is met if the evidence shows that either
such a pattern or practice existed or that the organization was created for the purpose of engaging
in such a pattern or practice.184 However, the Board indicated that “if there are only isolated
instances in which the group makes ad hoc proposals to management followed by a management
response of acceptance or rejection by word or deed, the element of dealing is missing.”185
Because the committees in question entailed employees discussing and submitting proposals on
statutory subjects to management committee members who could reject them if they chose, the
Board found the “dealing with” requirement met.186
Later board decisions confirmed the “dealing with” prong requires a pattern or practice of
interactions between workers and an employer and not isolated incidents between the parties.187
However, the Board’s Electromation progeny has raised many questions that remain
unanswered. For one, Cabot Carbon’s holding that “dealing with” is not synonymous with
collective bargaining begs the question: “if ‘dealing with’ is less than bargaining, what is it more
than?”188 The Board has not yet established the lower limits of the “dealing with” definition,
meaning the Board could ultimately decides it includes activities that worker centers commonly
engage in.189 Secondly, some academics have sensed a tension between the Supreme Court’s
decision in Cabot Carbon and the NLRB’s later decisions. Professor Michael Duff questions the
distinction between E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.’s “pattern or practice” refinement and
collective bargaining, asking why it is the case that “a statutory labor organization may be found
without ‘bargaining’, but that a ‘pattern and practice of exchanging proposals over time’ implies
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that a group is a labor organization?”190 With this confusion and the NLRB’s failure to clarify it,
Professor Duff comments that “it is often risky to rely on the NLRB’s statutory interpretations
given the reality of hostile appellate review,” further emphasizing the uncertainty surrounding
the § 2(5) analysis and how it might be applied to worker centers.191
However, all is not lost in this confusion. There has been one occasion to date in which
the activities of a worker center were analyzed under the “labor organization” jurisprudence, and
the outcome was favorable to worker centers. In 2006, the General Counsel of the NLRB issued
an Advice Memorandum at the behest of a Regional Director stating his findings on whether the
ROC was a labor organization under § 2(5) and therefore could be found in violation of the
NLRA’s restrictions against recognitional picketing under § 8(b)(7)(C).192 The memo addresses
complaints filed against the worker center Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York (ROCNY) in response to demonstrations ROC-NY led against a few upscale chefs and the subsequent
settlement agreements that were reached. In one case, the ROC-NY protested outside of chef
Daniel Boulud’s restaurant Daniel in response to the chef’s discrimination against Haitian and
Bangladeshi employees applying to become waiters.193 ROC-NY engaged in similar
demonstrations against chef Mario Batali’s restaurant Del Posto over misappropriated tips and
unpaid overtime, reaching a $1.5 settlement agreement that “included new polices on promotions
and paid sick days.”194
The General Counsel found that, although the ROC-NY’s lawsuit settlement negotiations
with the restaurants “could arguably be considered ‘dealing’ within an expansive interpretation
of Section 2(5)”, the evidence did not show that ROC-NY’s conduct constituted “a pattern or
practice of dealing over time.”195 In support of its decision, the General Counsel analyzed the
ROC-NY’s lawsuit settlement negotiations through the Electromation progeny, finding that the
lawsuit settlement negotiations and subsequent agreements were discrete, non-reoccurring
interactions with the employers that were limited to “settling legal claims raised by
employees.”196 Despite the fact the negotiations spread across a span of time, the General
Counsel considered this to be dealings that were “limited to a single context or single issue” and
that nothing in the agreements implied “an ongoing or reoccurring pattern of dealing with
employment terms and conditions, beyond the resolution of the current dispute.”197 Absent a
showing of pattern or practice of dealing over time, the General Counsel held that ROC-NY was
not a labor organization under § 2(5).198 While some academics take issue with the analysis
undertaken by the General Counsel199, this decision provides a potential framework under which
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worker centers could be analyzed by the NLRB in the future. Based on both the text of the
statute and the holding of the ROC memo, some academics have argued that worker centers
would not fall under the statutory definition of labor organization200.
Although an updated survey of worker centers would be useful, the information currently
available suggests that the explicit purpose of worker centers as well as the activities undertaken
by the centers would not qualify as a pattern or practice of dealing with an employer, or the
purpose of engaging in such a pattern or practice. While worker centers engage in economic
action organizing that seeks to place economic pressure on employers, these direct action
campaigns are traditionally a tactic that supplements a lawsuit or other legal claim filed against
the employer and serves as a method to encourage employers to enter settlement agreements.
Worker centers do not have an ongoing role at any particular work place, and they will likely not
engage with a particular employer a second time unless there is a violation of any settlement
agreement or court order. Based on the analysis in the ROC Memo, this form of direct economic
action campaign and settlement agreement negotiations do not constitute “dealing with” under
the NLRA.
Moreover, worker centers do not exist for the purpose of dealing with individual
employers in the sense envisioned by the act. The historical goal of worker centers is to give a
collective voice to marginalized, vulnerable workers in a variety of industries. Centers seek to
place the concerns of these workers on the national agenda by advocating for better enforcement
of current labor and employment law protections and for more protective regulation and
legislation. In their efforts to increase public awareness and spur public and political action,
centers engage in social policy organizing, which may involve demonstrations, protests, and
boycotts of individual employers or multiple employers within an industry. These activities seek
to engage the public and government officials, and not just employers. Actions that engage
employers are necessary to the main objective of worker centers: elevate the social, political,
economic interests of low-wage workers so as to be an equal player at the bargaining table.
2.
Labor organization under the LMRDA
The “labor organization” analysis under the LMRDA is almost identical to the analysis
under § 2(5) of the Wagner Act, although there is some debate about whether the definition of
labor organization under the LMRDA expands the scope of the NLRA or limits it. Despite this
uncertainty, there is a strong argument to be made that worker centers do not fall within the
statutory definition of labor organization under the LMRDA. § 3(i) of the LMRDA defines a
labor organization as “a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce and
includes any organization of any kind, any agency, or employee representation committee,
group, association, or plan so engaged in which employees participate and which exists for the
purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes,
wages, rates of pay, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment, and any conference,
general committee, joint or system board, or joint council so engaged which is subordinate to a
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national or international labor organization, other than a State or local central body.”201 Besides
the added language about the type of organization included under the statute and the types of
subjects that are dealt with, this definition contains the same elements as the definition under the
Wagner Act: some form of organization, employee participation, the purpose of dealing with
employers, and dealing with statutory subjects.
However, § 3(i) is followed by § 3(j) which defines when a labor organization will be
deemed to be engaged in an industry affecting commerce.202 There is a debate between some
academics as to the relationship between these two sections. Some argue that § 3(j) limits the
scope of § 3(i) in that in order to be a § 3(i) labor organization, an entity must fall within one of
the five categories of § 3(j)203. Others argue that § 3(j) should not be read to limit § 3(i) but
rather to add clarity to what it could mean for an organization to be engaged in an industry that
affects commerce.204 Labor advocate Eli Naduris-Weissman notes that while there is no
definitive guidance on the appropriate reading of these two sections, regulations from the
Department of Labor may help to shed some light. Although the regulations specify that the term
“labor organization” will be interpreted broadly, the regulations “also suggest that a ‘labor
organization’ must meet the general definition of section 3(i) as well as one of the categories of
section 3(j) to be subject to the LMRDA requirements.”205
Despite this uncertainty in the proper reading of the statute, the labor organization
analysis is still likely to hinge on the “dealing with” interpretation. If § 3(i) and § 3(j) are read
together, it could be argued either way whether worker centers fall within the five categories of
organizations under § 3(j).206 If worker centers do fall within one of these five categories, the
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question of labor organization status will turn on whether the center exists for the purpose of
“dealing with” under § 3(i), which is analyzed under the § 2(5) labor organization
jurisprudence.207
Similar to the NLRB General Counsel’s Memo regarding whether ROC-NY fell within
the scope of § 2(5), the Department of Labor, the agency that oversees enforcement of the
LMRDA, engaged in the labor organization analysis under § 3(i) of the LMRDA in responding
to a request from Republican congressmen for a Department inquiry into the status of worker
centers. In 2013, Representatives Kline and Roe sent a letter addressed to Secretary Perez
requesting an official determination on whether worker centers, naming six centers in particular,
are labor organizations under the LMRDA and are therefore required to comply with the
reporting and disclosure provisions of the act.208 In response, the Department of Labor sent a
letter to Chairman Kline outlining the Department’s historical framework for analyzing labor
organization status under § 3(i) and its previous determinations as to whether ROC falls within
the statutory definition of labor organization.209
In his response letter, the Assistant Secretary of the Department of Labor explained that
in making labor organization determinations for purposes of LMRDA enforcement, the
Department applies the statutory test under § 3(i), which requires a showing that the entity is (1)
an organization engaged in an industry affecting interstate commerce, (2) involves the
participation of employees, and (3) exists in whole or part for the purpose of dealing with
employers on terms and conditions of employment.210 While the letter declined to specifically
address the request for information on the six worker centers, the letter reminded the Chairman
that the Department has “twice concluded—in 2004 and 2008—the ROC is not a labor
organization under the LMRDA.”211 The Assistant Secretary explained that the evidence
presented did not show that ROC was the exclusive representative of the employees, had
engaged in collective bargaining, negotiated terms and conditions with the employers, or had the
purpose of doing any of the above. Further, the evidence failed to show any “interchange of any
kind between ROC and employers and, therefore, no dealing or intent to deal existed between
ROC and employers.”212 The letter specifically stated that the Department, in these two
decisions, noted that “the routine activities of legal service providers and activities targeting
employers such as picketing, handbilling, and protesting, did not constitute dealing.”213 Without
providing any explanation, the letter also indicated that the Department concluded that “ROC
was not engaged in an industry affecting commerce under section 3(j) of the Act.”214
As analysis under the LMRDA definition of labor organization is likely to closely mirror
the analysis under § 2(5), the same arguments can be made in support of the position that worker
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centers do not fall within the statutory definition of labor organization and therefore should not
be subjected to the requirements and restrictions of the LMRDA. If the NLRB and Department
of Labor remain consistent with their past decisions and advice statements, then the normal range
of worker center activities will not be considered “dealing with” because they will not pass the
pattern or practice standard. If worker centers engage employers at all, it is likely to be similar to
the activities ROC-NY engaged in, which included action through legal processes and
simultaneous demonstrations and pickets. As these activities were seen as isolated activities
pertaining to a single issue or context by both the NLRB and the Department of Labor, there is a
strong argument to be made in support of future similar worker center activity based on this
precedent.
B.
Policy and constitutional arguments against applying current labor law
restrictions to worker centers
In addition to this textual argument as to why worker centers are not bound by the NLRA
and LMRDA’s provisions regarding labor organizations, academics have made poignant policybased and constitutional arguments as to why these provisions should not be applied to worker
centers. As worker centers seek to represent, organize, and advocate on behalf of workers across
employers based on shared industry, geography, ethnicity, or immigrant status, centers appear to
be “more like social movement organizations than traditional labor unions” at times.215 Many of
the concerns that spurred the passage of the Wagner Act and the LMRDA are not present in the
worker center context and make application of the stringent restrictions and requirements
inappropriate. Making it their mission to fight for social and economic justice, worker centers
have provided a collective voice for workers marginalized in both the workforce and in general
society. Therefore, the collective action of worker centers resembles protected political speech,
raising constitutional concerns with any attempt to restrict or interfere with it.
1.
Concerns inherent in labor prohibitions absent in worker center context
Based on his findings from his study, Eli Naduris-Weissman suggested that the NLRB
“has exercised discretion when applying the term ‘labor organization’ guided by the policy
concerns underlying the NLRA provision being adjudicated.”216 Reviewing several Board
decisions in which § 2(5) was interpreted and applied, Eli Naduris-Weissman found that
“[T]he Board often uses the labor organization definition to further the Act’s
purposes. Informal employee groups will be considered “labor organizations” in
some cases where such a finding is necessary to punish employer activity that
trenches on section 7 rights. However, where a finding of “labor organization”
would subject the informal group to liability…the definition of labor organization
loosens in order to protect concerted activity by employees.”217
If the Board is moved to exercise its discretion when the policy implications call for it, then it
should recognize the misfit of the policy underlying the current labor law provisions and the
reality of the worker center movement.
In enacting the Wagner Act, Congress sought to eliminate employer-dominated unions,
and this goal influenced the scope and language of the statute.218 The legislative history of the
Wagner Act indicates that labor organization was defined broadly in order to “encompass all
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forms of existing company unions within section 8(a)(2)’s company union prohibition”.219 The
questions raised by worker centers does not involve employer-dominated unions or any other
violation of § 8(a)(2). As the broad scope of the “labor organization” definition was intended for
the purpose of preventing employer interference in workers’ exercise of their § 7 rights, it is
inappropriate to use this breadth to sweep up worker centers within the scope of the statute.
Similarly, the LMRDA was drafted and enacted after the McClellan Committee made its
report of fraud, embezzlement, and other forms of corruption within the labor union
organizations. The provisions of the act sought to deter the misuse of organizational funds as
well as other abuses by increasing internal transparency and regulating the internal governance to
promote democratically-run organizations.220 However, there is no history, nor any allegation of,
worker center corruption, abuse, fraud, or violence.221 Most worker centers have modest
resources and rely primarily on charitable donations instead of membership dues for support,
limiting the opportunity of corrupt individuals to misuse organization funds. Additionally, most
worker centers are dedicated to promoting internal democracy as a “matter of philosophic
commitment.”222 In fact, worker centers have made leadership development and training a large
part of the services they offer workers in the hopes that workers themselves will play a role in the
decision making and leadership of the center.223
While the social policy of preventing labor organization corruption may become more
relevant in the worker center context as these organizations grow in power and size, there are
other external checks in place that make a blanket application of the stringent labor law reporting
and disclosure requirements unnecessary. In receiving financial support from charitable
foundations, it is likely worker centers will be required to comply with reporting requirements
and be subjected to some level of oversight by the charitable organization, which serves as a
check on worker center activity. Worker centers that have received tax-exempt 501(c)(3) status
will need to comply with the IRS’ financial reporting requirements.224 Moreover, membership in
a worker center is entirely voluntary, and worker centers do not assert themselves as the
exclusive representatives of all employees in any particular worksite.225 The reasons for
justifying the intrusions the NLRA and LMRDA imposed on private labor unions are not present
here.226
2.
Worker centers champion New Deal labor policies in the 21st century
The NLRA was enacted during a time of crisis. Workers were helpless against the power
of capital, and struggled to share in the abundance created by their toil. Through the Wagner Act,
Congress sought to empower the workers and to establish a balance between the relative
bargaining power of labor and capital. Congress postulated that if business had the right to
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organize and unionize as it wished, so too should labor. If the 1935 labor law is still in place, so
are these initial goals and findings. The ever-increasing domestic and global competition,
incentivizing employers to cut costs and structure their businesses in a way that will increase its
competitive edge, has created a contemporary labor crisis. Workers have been isolated from one
another through contingent work status and subcontracting work structures. Employers have
been permitted to fissure their businesses, shedding off peripheral activities and subcontracting
out some of its work, as well as to structure their employment relationships in a way that reduces
the cost of labor. However, unions have been prevented under the labor law’s restrictions on
boycotting and picketing from acting collectively against multiple employers or against
manufacturers or retailers to effectively pressure the enterprise with real power over workers.
Workers, particularly low-wage, immigrant workers, have been stripped of their
collective voice and their rights to collective action. When employers violate workers’ § 7 rights,
the remedies available under the NLRA fail to make workers whole or secure in their rights.
Worker centers, through their flexibility in strategy, ability to target employers beyond
employees’ direct employer, and public policy campaigns directed at entire industries and
sectors, have been able to re-establish some semblance of a balance between the relative power
of labor and capital. In a statement explaining its support of worker centers, the Ford Foundation
stated, “Growing numbers of workers are finding themselves in low wage jobs with limited
resources to support a family and move up the economic ladder. The foundation’s support for
worker centers is one part of our effort to help more hard-working people climb out of poverty
and achieve economic security.”227 Worker centers have helped to put the interests and concerns
of low wage workers back on the national agenda. By organizing national campaigns that
involve picketing and boycotting retailers, manufacturers, retailers, and franchisors who have the
ability to improve the conditions of low wage workers at the end of the supply chain, worker
centers have adapted traditional labor tactics to apply economic pressure on capital in the new
fissured economy. Through both its direct economic action organizing and “social
bargaining”228, worker centers have “the potential to salvage and secure one of labor law’s most
fundamental commitments: to help achieve greater economic and political equality in society.”229
Applying the restrictions under the NLRA against secondary boycotts would greatly
weaken worker centers’ ability to reach business entities lacking direct employer status but
having indirect control over the terms and conditions of employment for low-wage, immigrant
workers. The limitations and requirements under the NLRA and the LMRDA would fetter the
flexibility with which worker centers have been able to develop new solutions to new
organization challenges. As worker centers have used this flexible organizing and unencumbered
tactical decision-making to represent workers and industries initially deemed too difficult to
organize, applying the current labor law scheme to worker centers would leave low-wage,
largely immigrant workers without a voice at the bargaining table between labor and capital, in
contravention to the stated national labor policy.

227

Greenhouse, supra note 154.
Andrias, supra note 112 at 8 (defining social bargaining as a form of “bargaining that occurs in the public arena
on a sectoral and regional basis.” The article discusses the use of social bargaining to address worker issues on a
larger scale compared to traditional bargaining with a particular employer. Social bargaining may involve public
policy advocacy and organizing as well as direct action aimed at eliciting public and governmental attention and
support.).
229
Id. at 9.
228

3.
Application of NLRA and LMRDA restrictions would unjustifiably
violate worker center’s constitutional rights
As mentioned in Part VI.B.1, the historical justifications for labor law’s incursions into
the associational rights of private organizations are not present in the worker center context,
raising constitutional concerns regarding the prospect of applying intrusive reporting
requirements and restrictions on peaceful activities against worker centers. In his study, Eli
Naduris-Weissman explains the tension between labor law restrictions and First Amendment
associational rights:
“The goal of the NLRA was to establish a well-defined system of industrial
relations through which employee organizations and employers could manage
conflict. Organizations like worker centers, which do not seek to represent
employees over day-to-day workplace conflicts, do not fit well within this system.
Rather, many worker centers can better be classified as civil rights and social
movement groups who engage in the type of speech and litigation activity that has
been accorded the highest degree of First Amendment protection.”230
Worker centers engage in speech and action that is both politically and economically motivated,
which requires greater caution from government agencies in applying burdensome restrictions
than in the traditional labor union context.
Inherent in the above quote is the idea that the current labor scheme was based on a
compromise between capital and labor that was struck in 1935.231 “[T]raditional labor took part
in a conscious bargain in which it gave up certain associational rights and flexibility in exchange
for government support and protection.”232 Labor unions accepted the restrictions on the
organizing activities and, later, requirements for how they were to govern their organization in
order to have their position as the exclusive bargaining representative within a particular
workplace protected and enforced; worker centers have never sought these protections, nor have
they petitioned to be the exclusive representative of any group of employees before their
employer.233 Worker centers are entirely voluntary organizations, and there is “no constitutional
justification for failing to provide worker centers with the full freedoms of assembly and
association other voluntary associations receive.”234 Without receiving the protections under the
NLRA and securing the right to be the exclusive representative of any particular workplace,
worker centers should not be required to sustain the intrusion on their freedoms posed by the
NLRA’s restrictions on boycotting and picketing and the LMRDA’s provisions regulating the
internal governance and reporting. Applying the restrictions of the current labor law regime
would not only be inappropriate in terms of the policy underpinnings of the labor laws but also
constitutionally problematic.
In a 2015 guest post for the blog OnLabor, Cynthia Estlund, professor of employment
and labor law at NYU Law School, discussed the balance of powers and restrictions placed on
traditional labor unions under the labor law regime as well as the constitutional implications of
the absence of these particular rights in the worker center context.235 Estlund describes the
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bargain struck between capital and labor under the Wagner Act as labor law’s “quid pro quo” by
which the laws “both constrain and empower unions beyond what is normal and permissible for
voluntary associations.”236 Intrusive restrictions on labor union activity and self-governance can
find justification in the special legal rights and powers that labor law bestows on them.237 Estlund
describes these powers as including the right to vie to be the exclusive representative of
employees, both group members and non-members, based on majority vote; to compel individual
employers to bargain in good faith; and to bargain for the right to collect dues from nonmembers.238 However, worker centers do not possess or even seek to gain these rights. Worker
centers do not hold themselves out as the exclusive representative of employees in their
interactions with individual employers. Without possessing any of these powers, worker centers
are simply voluntary associations engaged in peaceful economic and policy organizing,
advocacy, and service to its members.239 “Without any distinctive legal powers, there is simply
no constitutional justification for denying to worker centers the full freedom of expression,
assembly, and association, and the freedom from intrusive regulation of their internal affairs,
which other voluntary associations enjoy.”240
The cannon of constitutional avoidance advises that courts refrain from interpreting a
statute “that raises serious constitutional questions.”241 The cannon has been applied in the
context of the NLRA, in which the Supreme Court held that “[W]here an otherwise acceptable
construction of [the Act] would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the
statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of
Congress.”242 In the context of worker centers, the cannon would caution the NLRB and the
Department of Labor against finding worker centers to be labor organizations under the NLRA
and the LMRDA. Finding worker centers to be labor organizations based on the lawsuit-based
direct action they engage in against particular employers would have a chilling effect on the right
of workers to petition the court for redress, a constitutional right deemed to be of the utmost
importance. Limitations on the direct action strategies employed by worker centers would be a
limitation on the rights of low-wage, immigrant workers to engage in collective activity for
mutual aid and protection. Restrictions on the rights of low-wage, immigrant workers to act
collectively through worker centers to publicize the economic, political, and social inequalities
they face would be an unwarranted and unconstitutional expansion of the labor law scheme, an
expansion unintended by Congress in drafting the legislation in 1935.
VII.

Conclusion
Concerned about the increasing rate of industrial strife, Congress drafted, debated, and
adopted the Wagner Act, and subsequent amendments, to create and maintain a balance in
economic power between capital and labor. The compromise struck between the parties called
for labor unions to agree to State interference in the tactics employed and their internal
governance in return for the protected and exclusive right to organize and represent workers in
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collective bargaining. Concerns about company unions, potential harm to neutral employers,
union corruption, and undemocratic practices within labor organizations influenced the
development of the labor law scheme and are integral in understanding the congressional intent
behind the NLRA and LMRDA. Viewed in this context, the labor laws are inapposite to the
situation that worker centers find themselves in. Worker centers have neither requested nor
received protected status as the exclusive collective bargaining representatives of individual
worksites, and they therefore should not be forced to suffer through State incursions into their
private right of assembly. In the absence of complaints of company unions, corruption, and
undemocratic practices, the broad definitions and sweeping statutory provisions developed in
response to these concerns in labor unions should not be used against worker centers. Business
groups posit worker centers as fronts for labor unions to avoid compliance with the law, but this
characterization fails to fully capture the history, purpose, and functions of worker centers in this
fissured economy. As worker centers may toe the line in terms of their “dealings with”
employers, the sociopolitical context and policy underpinnings of the current labor law regime
gravitate toward a finding of non “labor organization” status.

